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In this study with 153 middle school students, we investigate the influence of the number of
decimal places from the reading of a measurement device on students’ decisions to change or keep an
initial hypothesis about falling objects. Participants were divided into three groups, introduced to two
experiments—the time it takes a free falling object with a zero, and a nonzero initial horizontal velocity to
fall a certain distance—and asked to state a hypothesis that compares the falling times of the two
experiments. We asked the participants whether they wanted to change or keep their initial hypothesis after
they were provided with data sets. Members of each group were given the same number of measurements
but with a different number of decimal places. Results show that for an increase in the number of decimal
places, the number of participants switching from a false to a correct hypothesis decreases, and at the same
time the number of students switching from a correct to a false hypothesis increases. These results
indicate that showing more exact data to students—given through different resolutions of the measurement
device—may hinder students’ ability to compare data sets and may lead them to incorrect conclusions. We
argue that this is due to students’ lack of knowledge about measurement uncertainties and the concept of
variance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judging the quality of data is a core competence that
students should have [1], and being able to interpret data is
a skill that is growing more important in our technological
society [2]. Hence, data evaluation is included in science
standards in different countries (e.g., USA: NGSS, UK:
Department for Education, GER: Kultusministerkonferenz,
NLD: SLO [3–6]). For example, students should be able
to use data as evidence to justify a claim or hypothesis. To
make these justifications, students should have some level
of data literacy, which is fundamental to scientific argu-
mentation [7]. Otherwise, students—as novices in a field—
may base their justification on nonrational arguments [8]
like intuition, which can lead to weak learning outcomes
[9]. This is not to say that intuition is always irrational, as
Weber shows for experts in mathematics when they are
creating a proof [10].
For (scientific) claims to be justified or, more generally,
to construct an empirically sound argument, experiments
are conducted to gather empirical data as evidence. For a
robust justification, the data have to be analyzed and
interpreted [11]. The relevance and quality of these
justifications thereby depend on the quality of the data.
However, students often experience difficulties in judging
the quality of the data. This can be illustrated with the
example that, when faced with anomalous data students
often tend to disregard the data as evidence, and fall back
to their prior beliefs [11,12]. The review paper by Garfield
and Ben-Zvi [13] shows that students’ understanding of
statistical concepts is often overestimated. Students are able
to perform calculations, but lack a conceptual understand-
ing. Because of this lack of deeper background knowledge
in analyzing data, students may rely on their limited
conceptions (e.g., knowing how to calculate a mean) or
construct intuitive knowledge (e.g., abstract cognitive
structures like “more measurements are better” comparable
to p-prims suggested by di Sessa [14]). Thus, it seems
likely that statistical data features like the number of
measurements, mean values, or variance and students’
competencies to work with these variables influence
students’ conclusions. Masnick and Morris [15] looked
at some aspects of students’ ability to compare data sets.
Students were shown two data sets with different sample
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size, means, variability within and between data sets, and
varied the sample size of the data sets. Results show that
students recognize differences in sample size, differences
in the mean, and variability between data sets. But
variability within the data set (variance) had little effect
on the students’ comparison of the data sets. The com-
petence in judging data sets is reported to increase with
age. This study shows that students, starting as early as
third grade, can interpret basic statistical quantities like the
mean, but the more complex quantities like variance need
more attention.
Further, measurement uncertainties—that can be the
source of variance in data—are rarely discussed in schools
even though they are inherent to allmeasurements and cannot
be neglected when analyzing data [16]. Consequently,
research shows students’ low competences in understanding
measurement uncertainties [13,16–18]. Lubben et al. [19]
have categorized students’ reasoning with data into two
categories: point paradigm and set paradigm. In the point
paradigm, students regard each measurement as an isolated
event, where repeated measures, when done right, result in
the same true value. In the set paradigm, students see a series
ofmeasurementswith randomvariation as away to approach
the true value. Allie et al. [20] report that most high school
students are firmly located in the point paradigm, and that
set-paradigm actions (such as calculating a mean) are mostly
rote responses.
Given the fact that students have difficulties in dealing
with uncertainties and at the same time construct intuitive
knowledge (e.g., the more exact the data, the better the
quality), how would they interpret data when both aspects
are in conflict? The question we ask is as follows: what is
the influence of the number of decimal places of measure-
ments in a data set on students’ decisions to keep or change
their hypothesis when comparing data sets in the context
of a physics problem? A typical idea a student may follow
is that increasing the number of decimal places increases
the exactness and, hence, the quality of a measurement
(“the more the better”). However, more decimal places
also make measurement uncertainties more obvious since
the measurement results—the single numerical measure-
ments that the students see—in the data set differ. Here,
the increasing exactness leads to an apparent increase in
variability, which may be confusing to students (“the more
the worse”). So, does more exactness lead to more students
choosing the correct hypothesis? Can students use the given
exactness appropriately to draw the right conclusions?
With this study, we aim to answer the following ques-
tion: What is the influence of the number of decimal places
in the result of a physics experiment on school students’
decision when reevaluating their initial hypothesis? And if
the number of decimal places makes a difference in
students’ reevaluation of their hypotheses, do the methods
of analyzing the data or the differences seen in data sets
explain the effect? Finally, can the type of justifications
students refer to predict their choice of the correct
hypothesis?
II. METHOD
In this study, 153 participants of grades 8–10 (average
age 14 years) from an urban high school in Germany took
part (convenience sample). The school was chosen such
that the participants were unfamiliar with the context of
the study. All participants had good reading and writing
skills. The experiment was done during the normal 45-min
physics class, the participants had calculators available,
and we have found no evidence of participants not being
able to finish the questionnaire in time.
A. Introduction to the experiment
Prior to the questionnaire, the participants were shown a
4-min video showing and explaining the experimental
setup, and how the measurement data were collected.
One ball is attached to an electromagnet and is dropped
when a switch is pressed. As the ball falls through a
photogate, a computer starts a timer, the timer is stopped
once the ball reaches the photogate at the bottom. The
experiment is then repeated, but for a ball that is launched
by letting it roll down an incline. At the end of the incline,
at the same height as the dropped ball, a photogate is
placed. Again, the computer measures the time it takes the
launched ball to reach the second photogate at the bottom.
After seeing the video, the participants each got a
questionnaire, in which the experimental setup is depicted
(see Fig. 1) and the experimental procedure is repeated in
writing. With the questionnaire, we randomly assigned
the participants into one of three groups: A, B, and C.
The participants are asked to form a hypothesis (multiple
choice) as to which object has the longest falling time: the
free falling object, the launched object, or that this is the
same for both objects.
B. Showing the data set
After stating their initial hypothesis, the participants
were shown results of the experiment. Depending on the
group to which the participant was assigned (A, B, or C),
the participant saw a data set with a different number of
FIG. 1. A sketch of the experimental setup as shown to the
participants.
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decimal places, see Table I. Then, the participants had time
to analyze their data.
After the data analysis, the participants were asked
what strategy they would use to compare the two data
sets. The eight multiple-choice options given were 1 ¼
“compare the sums of the rows”, 2 ¼ “compare the means
of the rows”, 3 ¼ “compare the medians”, 4 ¼ “compare
the value that occurs most often (modus)”, 5 ¼ “calculate
pairwise differences and compare all these differences”,
6 ¼ “compare the data sets step by step in a pairwise
manner”, 7 ¼ “look at the rows and see if there is a
difference”, 8 ¼ “none of the above”. Options 1–5 indicate
a response where the student has a clear, purposeful
strategy in mind to compare the data. In contrast, options
6 and 7 are not as structured and purposeful. These answer
options were based on responses during a pilot study, and
resemble authentic student responses.
The participants were also asked (multiple choice)
whether they saw a “clear difference,” a “small difference,”
or “no difference” between the two data sets.
Then the participants were asked to reevaluate their
hypothesis, again in multiple-choice form.
C. Reasoning and justification
We asked the participants to write down their reasoning
for changing or not changing their hypothesis. This
reasoning was then classified into different categories,
as shown in the flowchart in Fig. 2. Quantitative reasons
that entail explicit numerical mentions of values referring
to specific data points, calculated means, total time,
differences, etc. were classified as numerical (code NM).
Reasons that mention words like: “clear,” “few,” “some,” or
other nonnumerical descriptions of the data were classified
as non-numerical (code NN). We also distinguish a group
of participants that did not mention the data but reasoned
on a theoretical basis (code T), and we have identified a
group of participants that neither reasoned in a numerical,
non-numerical, nor in a theoretical manner (code 0). Lastly,
there is a group that did not write down anything at all
(code NA). Two raters used a coding manual and coded a
sample of 20 responses (κ ¼ 0.93), which gave only one
discrepancy that was resolved in discussion. After that, one
rater coded the remainder of the responses.
Finally, we presented the participants with twenty state-
ments about factors that might have had an influence on
the reevaluation of their hypothesis. The participants were
asked to which extent the statement applied in their
decision to change or keep their hypothesis using a five-
point Likert scale. The steps on the scale ranged from 1 ¼
“(statement) does not apply”, to 5 ¼ “(statement) fully
applies”. These twenty items probe the influence of the
following four factors on participants’ justification in a self-
assessment: data as evidence, measurement uncertainties,
expert knowledge, and intuition. These items are thor-
oughly described by Ludwig [9].
III. RESULTS
Prior to showing the participants the data, 58% thought
the launched ball would have the longest drop time, 33% of
the participants thought the objects would land at the same
time (correct solution), and 9% thought that the free-falling
object would have the longest drop time. There were no
significant differences between the groupsA,B, andC at this
time, χ2ð4Þ ¼ 1.85, p > 0.1. The distribution is similar to
one of the groups described in Whitaker [21]. This satisfies
our assumption of homogeneity among the three groups.
A. Reevaluation of the hypothesis
After showing the data sets to the different groups, we
asked the participants to reevaluate their hypothesis. We
made five different categories of how participants change
their hypothesis; correct to correct (CC), correct to false
(CF), false to correct (FC), false to other false (FoF), and
false to the same false (FF). The percentage distribution of
the participants in the three groups (A, B, and C) is shown
in Table II. We see that the distribution of the number of
participants over these different categories differs signifi-
cantly between groups and has a medium effect strength,
χ2ð8Þ ¼ 15.55, p < 0.05, w ¼ 0.32.
In group A (two decimal places), 40% of the participants
switched from a false to the correct hypothesis; in groups B
(three decimal places) and C (four decimal places) this
percentage is lower at 31% and 33%, respectively. On the
FIG. 2. The flow chart of classifications for the reasoning given
by the participants when reevaluating their hypothesis after
having seen the data.
TABLE I. The data sets of the two experimental settings as
shown to the different groups A, B, and C. Times are in seconds.
Free fall Launched
A B C A B C
0.53 0.535 0.5351 0.53 0.535 0.5350
0.53 0.535 0.5353 0.53 0.535 0.5352
0.53 0.535 0.5355 0.53 0.534 0.5347
0.53 0.534 0.5347 0.53 0.535 0.5354
0.54 0.534 0.5349 0.53 0.535 0.5351
0.53 0.534 0.5348 0.53 0.535 0.5352
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other hand, no participants in group A switched from
a correct to a false hypothesis, whereas in both group B
and C, about 10% of the participants switched from a
correct to a false hypothesis.
We thus conclude that when we increase the number of
decimal places of a given data set, the number of students
switching from a false to a correct hypothesis decreases,
and at the same time triggers some students to switch from
a correct to a false hypothesis.
B. Participants’ data analyzing methods and
perceived differences in the data sets
Can this result be explained by different data analysis
methods in the three groups? Or do students’ views
regarding the differences they see in the data sets vary
between the groups? When asked about the strategy to
compare the data, we found no significant differences
between the groups for the distribution of these strategies,
χ2ð12Þ ¼ 16.58; p > 0.1. An average of 76% of the partic-
ipants chose to compare the sums of the rows or the means
of the rows (options 1 and 2), none of the participants chose
to compare the median (option 3), and 3%–7% chose the
other options.
In participants’ responses to the question whether they
saw a clear, small or no difference between the data sets, we
did not find any significant difference between groups,
χ2ð4Þ ¼ 4.62; p > 0.1. In general, 83% of all participants
report seeing a small difference between the data sets. This
might be due to the fact that we made the answer option
multiple choice, and that the participants each have differ-
ent interpretations of the answer options clear and small.
We conclude that neither the data analysis method nor
the perceived difference between the two data sets explains
why the three groups differ in their choices of the post
hypotheses.
C. Participants’ quantitative and qualitative reasoning
For the classification of participants’ reasoning for the re-
evaluation of their hypothesis, we looked at the difference
in quantitative reasoning, and qualitative reasoning. We
consider all the numerical reasons (code NM) as quanti-
tative, and all the non-numerical, and theory-based reasons
(code NN and T) as qualitative. Table III shows the
percentage distribution over these two categories for groups
A, B, and C. Four participants had other reasons (code 0),
and five participants did not give a reason for their
hypothesis (code NA). These participants were taken out
of the statistics. In total there were 32 participants that
wrote down a quantitative reason, and 112 participants that
wrote down a qualitative reason.
We see that the distribution of responses in groupsB andC
are identical, and the number of participants that base their
reasoning on a quantitative explanation is more than half of
that in groupA.When the results of groupsB andCare added
and compared with group A, we see a significant difference
between groups A and Bþ C, χ2ð1Þ ¼ 4.24; p < 0.05.
Of the participants that wrote down a quantitative
reason, 84% end up making the right choice for the
reevaluation of their hypothesis. For those who gave a
qualitative reason, this is only 54%; see Table IV. The
difference between the quantitative and qualitative group is
significant, χ2ð2Þ ¼ 10.13; p < 0.01.
From this, we conclude that increasing the number of
decimal places shifts the students’ thinking to a more
qualitative way of data perception and comparison. This
shift, in turn, leads to a worse judgment in data comparison.
D. Influencing factors on the justification
of the hypothesis
Lastly, we looked at four factors (data as evidence,
measurement uncertainties, intuition, and expert knowl-
edge), and to what degree they have influenced the
participant’s decision to reevaluate their hypothesis. We
find a negative correlation of medium strength between
data as evidence, and intuition-based justification in
group B, r ¼ −0.40, p < 0.01. For group C we find the
TABLE II. Percentage of participants switching their hypoth-
esis after having seen the data. The different categories are
labeled: CC ¼ kept the correct hypothesis, CF ¼ switched from
the correct to a false hypothesis, FC ¼ switched from a false to
the correct hypothesis, FoF ¼ switched from a false to the other
false hypothesis, FF ¼ kept the same false hypothesis.
Group
Category A (n ¼ 52) B (n ¼ 52) C (n ¼ 49)
CC 35 25 18
CF 0 9 10
FC 40 31 33
FoF 13 27 16
FF 12 8 23
TABLE III. Percentage of participants in the different groups
that base the reasoning of their hypothesis on quantitative (code
NM) or qualitative (code NN and T) grounds.
A (n¼ 50) B (n¼ 48) C (n ¼ 46)
Quantitatively (n¼ 32) 32 17 17
Qualitatively (n¼ 112) 68 83 83
TABLE IV. Percentage distribution of participants’ reevaluated
hypotheses for quantitative (code NM) and qualitative (code NN
and T) reasoning.
Quantitatively (n ¼ 32) Qualitatively (n ¼ 112)
Same 84 54
Free fall 6 30
Launched 10 16
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same negative correlation but with a large strength,
r ¼ −0.54, p < 0.001. This correlation does not emerge
in group A, r ¼ −0.09, p > 0.1. This means that, when
more exact data are shown to students, the ones that rely on
data as evidence for their justification do not rely on their
intuition, and vice versa.
For participants who had a false initial hypothesis, we
looked at which factors, influencing the justification, had a
positive influence on the chances of participants changing
to the correct hypothesis. To do this we conducted a logistic
regression model and excluded non-significant factors in a
step-by-step manner. We found that a higher score on the
factors data as evidence and measurement uncertainties,
leads to an increase in the odds of changing to the right
hypothesis; see Table V. For the factor data as evidence, this
means that a one-step increase on the Likert scale increases
the odds of changing to a correct hypothesis by 1.80 times.
Both effects are small but significant, p < 0.05.
IV. DISCUSSION
The results of our study indicate that the number of
decimal places in quantitative experimental data reduces
students’ ability to critically compare data sets. This, in
turn, may hinder students’ learning of physics content.
Better measurement equipment—that leads to more exact-
ness by means of more decimal places in the measurement
results and hence stronger evidence—can lead some
students to reject a correct hypothesis.
How can this be explained? While 76% of the partic-
ipants indicated they compared the means or the sums of
the rows of their two data sets, they knew no method to
judge if the calculated difference between the two is
relevant. Hence, one possibility is that they disregarded
the data and made their decision based on theoretical or
everyday life beliefs. Another explanation is that they stuck
to the quantitative data and made their decision whether to
change or keep their initial hypothesis solely by comparing
two numbers. If the numbers differed, participants assumed
that there is a main effect.
This is in line with a study conducted by Priemer and
Hellwig [16], in which students measured temperatures
inside foam cubes of different sizes and used only the
readings of the thermometer with all its digits to investigate
if there are differences between the temperatures. One of
the students’ lines of argument was that if the numbers
differ, there must be a main effect. Thus, they came to the
wrong conclusion that the size of the foam cubes influences
the temperature inside. This is in line with our finding that
the majority of students see a small difference between the
data sets. Of course the terms clear, and small are subjective
terms, but the students’ responses are independent of the
number of decimal places. Also, the reevaluation of their
hypothesis indicates that the students have no way of
determining whether this small difference is relevant.
So, how do the students reason? We see that, when we
increase the number of decimal places, a negative correlation
between the factors “data as evidence” and “intuition”—
factors that students reported as having influenced their
justification—emerges: The less students argue with evi-
dence, the more they base their decision on intuition. So, if
we use our result that more exact data lead to more students
who put empirical evidence aside and use qualitative
justifications, we can conclude that this leads to more
intuitive decisions. This pattern in turn supports our claim
that showingmore exact data to students reduces their ability
to critically compare data sets. This is also supported by our
finding that studentswho reason in a quantitativemanner are
significantly better at the reevaluation of their hypothesis
than the students that answer in a vague, qualitative manner.
Furthermore, students that are able to justify the reeval-
uation of their hypothesis based on data as evidence (and
measurement uncertainties), have increased odds of switch-
ing to the correct hypothesis. We believe that these students
are better at comparing the data and can incorporate this in
their justification without having to rely on their intuition.
Why is it that students who know how to calculate means
appear to be so overwhelmed by the data that they cannot
gauge the significance of the difference between the means
and fall back on their intuition? We think that the absence
of the concept of (some measure of) variance hinders the
students to put the difference into perspective. Students
may not be surprised by varying measurement results under
changing conditions, e.g., temperatures during a year.
However, in our setting they might not even expect a
spread in measurement results, because the repeated
measurements were taken under identical conditions. We
already saw that students who are able to justify the
reevaluation of their hypothesis based on measurement
uncertainties, have increased odds of switching to the
correct hypothesis. These students rely on the measurement
uncertainties for their justification, making it an integral
part of their argumentation. They might be able to compare
the two mean values, recognize that their difference falls
within the range of the measurement uncertainties, and
conclude that there exists no (significant) difference
between the data sets. With that, they have incorporated
variance into their argumentation, complementary to the
mean value.
TABLE V. The logistic regression model for changing to a
correct hypothesis for the predictors data as evidence and
measurement uncertainties. The odds show that the chance of
changing from a false to the correct hypothesis increase when the
justification is based on these predicting factors. *p < 0.05.
Odds ratio
Factor B SE Lower Center Upper
Data as evidence 0.59* 0.25 1.11 1.80 3.03
Measurement uncertainty 0.51* 0.22 1.10 1.66 2.59
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHERS
The result that more exact data decrease students’ ability
to judge the quality of data, and consequently the evidence
for (scientific) claims, is somewhat unsettling. One obvious
and seemingly “easy” way of helping students in tasks that
involve the comparison of data sets would be to simply
reduce the number of decimals. Our study shows that this
will increase students’ achievement. This, however, ignores
the fact that students will encounter data of any exactness
in their everyday lives. But, more important, this only hides
measurement uncertainties away from the students by
making uncertainties “invisible.” Clearly, the uncertainties
still exist. Using the convention that the last digit of a digital
measurement device indicates the uncertainty of this device
(no matter how many measurements are made), we can
state that decreasing the number of decimal places on the
device increases the measurement uncertainty. This is
because the statistical variance (in the form of random
fluctuations in the measurements) becomes smaller than
the uncertainty of the device (for two decimal places this
is 0.01 s, for three decimal places 0.001 s, etc.). So, giving
students less exact data not only increases the measurement
uncertainty but also misleads students to believe that the
uncertainties disappear. Our participants in group A—those
who worked only with two decimal places—may have
chosen the right answer for a wrong reason. Assuming an
absence of uncertainties (or not being aware of uncertainties
at all), they judged their data as “perfect” and based their
decision on this condition. In contrast, the students that
realized a variance in the data—statistical fluctuations—
became hesitant and more critical concerning the quality of
the data. For this reason, some of the students choose not to
use the quantitative data at all but made their decision based
on qualitative justifications. Because of very limited knowl-
edge here, they had to rely on intuition or vague everyday life
concepts that lead to wrong conclusions. Thus, we must
teach the students the necessary skills to compare data to
enable them to make use of more precise measurements
and high quality data.
To improve this skill we suggest that students will
have to supplement their notion of the result—which
now only consists of the mean value—with some form
of a confidence interval. Without this interval around the
mean value, students will have no way of judging the (in)
significance of the difference between the mean values,
other than their intuitive response. Since students often
experience difficulties when thinking about measurement
uncertainties, e.g., [13,22], care has to be taken in designing
suitable tasks.
In order to do this, we suggest that teachers should
design tasks that increase students’ awareness and under-
standing of measurement uncertainties and variance. First
students should be made aware of the unavoidable presence
of measurement uncertainties. This would, in turn, create a
need for some confidence interval around the mean, which
can be quantified. This interval can be a rudimentary
quantity like minimum-maximum values, percentage
spread around the mean, or the spread between the middle
n data points. More advanced students could even go as
far as to calculate the more formal variance or standard
deviation. The next step is to make this interval an integral
part of the result, complementary to the mean. With that,
students can compare two measurement results by looking
at the degree of overlap between the confidence intervals.
We believe that this understanding of variance and meas-
urement uncertainties will allow students to reason based
on the data in a quantitative manner, and lead them away
from intuitive responses.
There are several examples in science contexts to be
found, e.g., Refs. [16,23,24]. But teaching about measure-
ment uncertainties and variance is not a task reserved just
for science teachers. Since data, and judging the quality of
this data, is becoming so prominent in our everyday lives,
teachers in all subjects should try to incorporate this into
their classes. This can be done in a quantitative way of
calculation, but also in a qualitative way by raising
awareness and discussing the limits of results, and the
validity of claims.
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